which we already know exists or can be, or also if, among those features that are said to pertain to it, one contradicts another. Accordingly, that is *impossible* which contains something contradictory within it such as, for instance, an iron wood. From which one sees further that that is *possible* which contains nothing contradictory within it, that is, which not only can obtain along with other things which are or can be, but which also contains only that within it which can obtain together such as, for instance, a wooden plate. For to be a plate and to be made of wood do not conflict with each other but rather both can be at once.

§13. (*That which is possible does not on that account exist.*) For something to be it is not enough that it does not contain anything contradictory in it. For, if one permits me to give a rather mundane example for the sake of clarity, it is clear that a square table does not become round on account of the fact that being square and being round do not contradict one another, but both can quite well obtain together insofar as we can conceive that the square table becomes rounded when the corners are worn off. Now, since that which is possible contains nothing contradictory in it (§12), so it is more than clear that something does not yet exist because it is possible, and it is not permitted to infer from possibility alone that something is or will be.

§14. (*What actuality is.*) There must be something more, therefore, in addition to possibility that pertains when something is said to exist, whereby that which is possible attains its fulfillment. This fulfillment, or complement,[1] of the possible is just that which we call actuality. [. . .]

§15. (*What is actual is possible.*) Since nothing other than what is possible can become actual (§14), so everything actual is also possible, and one can always infer from actuality to possibility without hesitation. When I see, namely, that something is, I can assume that it can be.

§16. *(What a thing is.)* Everything that is possible, whether it is actual or not, is called a *thing*. Thus, when we take something impossible to be possible, we likewise call it a thing but out of error because it seems to us to have the appearance of possibility. [. . .]

§17. (*What is identical and what is different.*) When I can posit the thing B for the thing A, and everything remains as before, then A and B are *identical*; if however I posit B for A and everything does not remain as before, then A and B are *different* or *distinct things.*

§18. (*What is similar and dissimilar.*) Two things, A and B, are *similar* to one another when that on the basis of which one is supposed to cognize and differentiate them from one another is the same on both sides; by contrast, A and B are *dissimilar things* when that on the basis of which one is supposed to cognize and differentiate them from one another is different on both sides. In this way, *similarity* is an agreement in that on the basis of which one is supposed to cognize and differentiate things from one another.

§28. (*What nothing is.*) That which neither is, nor is possible, is called *nothing*, and therefore something also cannot come to be from nothing. For then the impossible would have to become possible, which runs contrary to the principle of contradiction.

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[1] In the glossary that constitutes the first register, Wolff indicates that the German "*Erfüllung*" is his rendering of the Latin "*complementum*."

§29. (*What a reason is, and what it means to have a reason.*) If a thing, A, contains something in it from which one can understand why B is (B might be something in A or outside of it), one calls that which is in A the *reason* of B; A itself is called the *cause* and concerning B one says that it *finds its reason*[2] in A. I will explicate this by means of an example. If I investigate how it transpires that everything grows quickly in a garden, and find that it is to be attributed to the warmth of the air, then the warmth is the reason of the fast growth, and the air, insofar as it is warm, is the cause; the fast growth, however, finds its reason in the warm air. [. . .]

§30. (*The principle of sufficient reason.*) Were it the case that something could be, or take place, in a thing without a reason why it should occur being met with either in that thing itself or something else, then it would come to be from nothing. Since, however, it is impossible that something could come to be from nothing (§28), *everything that is must have a sufficient reason why it is.* We will call this proposition the *principle of sufficient reason.* Leibniz first proved the importance of this proposition in our times through his excellent probative discussion in his *Theodicy* as well as in the letters which he exchanged with the Englishman Clarke, though Archimedes had long ago grounded his doctrine of the equilibrium or balanced state of heavy bodies on it.[3] Leibniz accepted the principle as a proposition grounded in experience, against which one cannot bring forth any example, and thus he gave no proof even though Clarke demanded one.

§31. (*Further proof of the same.*) The principle is also proved in the following way. Suppose two things, A and B, which are identical. If something can be which does not have a sufficient reason why it is either in the thing or outside of it, then an alteration can occur in A that would not follow in B, were one to put B in the position of A. As a result, B is not the same thing as A (§22). Now since if the principle of sufficient reason is not allowed to hold it follows from the assumption that A is identical with B that A is not identical with B, and it is impossible for something to be and not be at once (§10), so the principle must be accorded incontestable correctness, that is, it is true: everything has its reason why it is.

§32. (*How that is constituted which pertains to a thing.*) If accordingly there is a multiplicity that can be distinguished in a given thing, then there must be one among these which contains the reason why the rest pertains to that thing and, because this cannot in turn find its reason why it pertains to that thing in the others (as can easily be grasped by means of the principle of contradiction—§10), therefore it must pertain to it necessarily. For that which is necessarily so requires no further reason why it is thus.

§33. (*What essence is.*) That is called *essence* in which the reason is to be found for the rest of what pertains to a given thing. Whoever cognizes the essence of a thing can indicate the reason for everything that pertains to it.

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[2] Throughout I have rendered "*Grund*" and its cognates as "reason," though because this does not readily lend itself to a verbal form, I have opted for the locution "*finds its reason*" to render "*gegründet wird.*"

[3] Archimedes is mentioned in this context by Leibniz; cf. Leibniz's second letter to Clarke, §1.

§34. (*Essence is primary in a thing.*) That which contains the reason for the rest is what first permits of being thought of a thing. That which finds its reason in it cannot be posited beforehand, for one must set out from that from which I can cognize why something else is. Therefore, essence is what first permits of being thought of a thing.

§35. (*What it consists in.*) There is nothing that can be thought of a thing prior to how it is possible, since it is only on account of the fact that it is possible that it is a thing in the first place (§16). Therefore, the essence of a thing is its possibility, and whoever knows the way and manner in which something is possible, understands its essence.

§36. (*What is necessary.*) When that which is opposed to a thing contains something contradictory, then that thing is *necessary*. Now, since that which contains something contradictory is impossible (§12), that is impossible which is opposed to something necessary, and if that which is opposed to a thing is impossible, then that same thing is necessary.

§38. (*The essence of a thing is necessary.*) That which is possible cannot at the same time be impossible (§10), and if something is possible in some way and manner then it cannot be impossible in the same way or manner at the same time. Now the essence of a thing consists in its being possible in a certain way and manner (§35), and therefore essence is necessary (§36).

§39. (*That which is necessary is eternal.*) That which is necessary is also *eternal*, that is, it can have neither beginning nor end. For, if something is necessary, then it is impossible for it not to be (§36). If, however, it had a beginning or end then it would be possible for it not to be.

§40. (*Essence is eternal.*) Now, since the essence of things is necessary (§36), so it is also eternal, that is, one cannot posit a time when it began to be possible and when it will cease to be possible.

§41. (*That which is necessary is also unchangeable.*) That which is necessary is in turn unchangeable. For if it could be changed then it could also not be, which conflicts with necessity (§36).

§42. (*Essence is unchangeable.*) On account of the fact that the essence of a thing is necessary (§38), it is also unchangeable. But if I can think a possible change in the essence of a thing, the essence of the thing is not thereby altered but rather through this cognition I have only come to cognize the essence of a different thing. For instance, the essence of a triangle consists in the enclosure of a space within three sides. It is possible that instead of three one can assume four sides and enclose a space thereby; yet, the essence of a triangle is not changed, since when four sides enclose a space one has a square and, therefore, a different thing.

§43. (*Nothing foreign can be communicated to an essence.*) Inasmuch as the essence of a thing is unchangeable and that thing would not remain the same if something in its essence were changed (§42), we can grasp that the essence of one thing cannot be communicated to another, that is, it is not possible that a thing should receive the essence of another thing in addition to its own essence and remain the same thing. This is so because all that pertains to a thing and is different from its essence must have its sufficient reason in its essence (§§32–33), and so nothing can be attributed to a thing that does not find its reason in its own essence but rather the essence of another thing.

§44. (*What an attribute is.*) That which wholly and solely finds its reason in the essence of a thing is called an *attribute*. And therefore attributes cannot be separated from a thing and are just as unchangeable as the essence itself.

§45. (*What is outside of us and one another.*) If we attend to ourselves, we will find that we are conscious of many things as outside of us. However, we posit them outside of us insofar as we cognize that they are differentiated from us; similarly, we posit them *outside of one another* insofar as we cognize that they are differentiated from one another.

§46. (*What space is.*) Now insofar as many things that exist at the same time, where one is not the other (§17), are represented as outside of one another, a certain order comes to be thereby such that if I take one among them for the first, then another becomes the second, another the third, another the fourth, and so on. And as soon as we represent this order to ourselves, we represent *space*. Therefore, if we want to regard things no differently than in the way in which we cognize them, then we must take space as the order of those things that exist at the same time.

§47. (*What place is.*) As such, there is for any given thing a certain way in which it exists simultaneously with others, so that none among the remaining things exists simultaneously in precisely this way with the others. And just this is what we tend to call the *place* of a thing.

§51. (*What composite things are.*) All those things of which we are conscious as outside of us consist of many parts: for we find many parts that we can differentiate from one another in any given whole, and this multitude taken together constitutes but one thing because the parts are connected with one another (§24). We call such a thing that consists of many parts a *composite thing*.

§59. (*What the essence of composite things consists in.*) A composite thing is possible inasmuch as certain parts can be posited together in a certain way; therefore, its essence consists in the manner of composition (§35) and, accordingly, whoever can represent this manner of composition understands its essence.

§64. (*Composite things come to be and cease to be.*) Composite things can come to be and cease to be. Their essence consists merely in the composition of their parts (§59). Now, however, since parts do not take up their place necessarily (§50), it is possible that some could come together in a manner in which they were not previously arranged, and in this way a composite thing comes to be. Likewise, it is also possible that some parts that are arranged in a certain manner could fall out of this ordering and it is in this way that a composite thing ceases to be.

§72. (*What sort of changes can occur in a composite thing.*) No changes can take place in a composite thing other than in magnitude and figure, in the positioning of its parts, in its internal motion, and in the place occupied by the whole thing. [. . .]

§73. (*Magnitude, figure, filling of space, and internal motion are properties of composite things.*) Because magnitude, figure, the filling of space and inner motion pertain to a composite thing on account of the fact that it consists of many parts (§§61, 54, 57), it follows that they find their reason in its essence (§59) and are therefore attributes of composite things.

§75. (*What is called a simple thing.*) Now as one calls that thing composite which has parts, so by contrast one calls that thing which has no parts a *simple thing*. [. . .]

§76. *(That there are simple things.)* Where there are composite things there must also be simple things. If there were no simple things at hand, then all parts of a thing, they might be supposed to be as small as you like, indeed even inconceivably small parts, would have to consists of other parts. Then, however, one could provide no more of a reason for where the composite parts ultimately arose from than one could conceive of how a composite number could arise when it did not encompass any units in it. And since nothing can be without a sufficient reason (§30), one must ultimately admit simple things from which composite things arise.

§81. (*Simple things have no figure, magnitude, internal motion, and also do not fill space.*) It has now been established that there must be simple things through whose composition the parts of other things come to be. Now, however, because these simple things have no parts (§75), and therefore are not themselves further composed out of other things (§51), and because magnitude, figure, filling of space and internal motion are attributes of composite things (§73), it follows that simple things have no figure and magnitude, that they cannot fill space, and that no internal motion is to be encountered in them.

§94. (*What time is.*) We attain to a concept of time insofar as we attend to the fact that our thoughts follow one upon the other and thereby cognize that something can come to be gradually. From this it becomes clear that if we are supposed to represent *time* in no other way than as it is found with us, then it is nothing else than an order of that which follows one upon the other such that if one takes one thing as the first, then another becomes the second, another the third, and so on.

§95. (*Similarity between time and space.*) Accordingly, what space is to those things that are next to each other at the same time, that is what time is to those things that occur one after another or where one follows upon the other (§§46, 49).

§99. (*What occurs in time.*) Everything that takes place gradually occurs in time. For since in such cases there is much that one can differentiate, where something precedes and something else follows (§89), a time has elapsed (§94[4]).

§100. (*Composite things can come to be over time.*) Since composite things can gradually come to be (§91), they also come to be over time, that is, while they come to be or attain to actuality, a time elapses.

§101. (*Simple things do not.*) By contrast, no time can elapse when a simple thing comes to be, if one supposes that it should come to be or attain to actuality because it was previously merely possible. For, if they are supposed to come to be then they have to come to be all at once (§89), but then nothing that follows one upon the other permits of being differentiated here while it comes to be (§90). And therefore, no time has elapsed (§94). And it is thus clear in general that nothing that occurs all at once takes place in time, that is, no time passes while it takes place.

§102. (*How a simple thing can cease to be.*) If a simple thing that exists at some point should cease to be again, then it would have to be brought to nothing. This is because it has no parts (§75), and so its essence cannot consist in composition (§59), and therefore it does not permit of being changed through division or internal displacement; consequently, its actuality cannot cease in the way it does with composite things (§64). However, if that which can cease to be neither through division nor internal displacement should cease to be, it must be annihilated.

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[4] Corrected from "§43."

§104. (*What an action and a passion is.*) If something is changed, then the reason of the change is either to be encountered in it or outside of it. One or the other is necessary (§30). A change, the reason of which is found within the thing that is changed, is called an *act* or an *action*: on the contrary, a change the reason of which is found in a thing other than that which is changed is called a *passion*.

§105. (*Why a thing can undergo something.*) Notwithstanding, however, that those changes that one tends to count as passions have a reason outside of those things in which they take place, a reason must also be found within those things for why they are able to be subject to such changes through the action of another thing. [. . .] Namely, since everything has a sufficient reason why it is (§30), a reason must be at hand for why a thing permits of being altered in this manner by another. And in this way it must be suited for a certain change, though what this aptitude consists in has to be established in the particular cases.

§106. (*Inner constitution of simple things.*) There are actually simple things (§76), and they cannot cease to be for themselves (§102). Therefore, something enduring must be encountered in them and this either has limits or not. Since a simple thing is indivisible in itself (§75), it follows that through these limits nothing else but a specific *degree* can come to be, which degree one represents as if it were composed, as it were, from other lesser degrees as from parts, and accordingly assigns a magnitude to it (§61). [. . .]

§107. (*What all changes are.*) All changes that take place in a thing, are alterations of its limits. For nothing more is to be met with in a thing than its essence and the limitations of what it has that is enduring in the essence. Essence is unchangeable in itself (§42), and therefore there is nothing else that can be changed other than the limits of that which is enduring in a thing. Accordingly, nothing else can happen during a change than that that which was limited in a given way only receives different limits. [. . .]

§108. (*What they are in simple things.*) In this way, all changes that can take place in a simple thing must be nothing else but an alteration of degree (§106). However, because nothing can occur without a sufficient reason (§30), one alteration must find its reason in the other, namely, the subsequent alteration finds its reason in the foregoing one.

§114. (*Difference between things that subsist for themselves and those that subsist through others.*) It is now possible to grasp the way in which things that subsist for themselves are distinguished from those that only subsist through others. Namely, a *thing that subsists for itself*[5] is that which has the source of its changes in itself; by contrast, a *thing that subsists through another*[6] is nothing else but a limitation of the former.

§115. (*What power is, and in which things it is to be found.*) One calls the source of changes a *power*, and understood as such one finds a power in every thing that subsists for itself, and the same is not to be encountered in things that subsist through others.

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[5] As Wolff indicates in the first register, this is his rendering of "*substantia*."

[6] Again, Wolff indicates that this is his rendering of "*accidens*."

§116. (*Things that subsist for themselves can act.*) Now since the changes which are to be borne by a thing that subsists for itself find a reason in it by means of this power (§29), so they are acts of the same thing (§104), and in such a way one sees that a thing that subsists for itself is able to act, and one therefore also cognizes that thing from this and also differentiates it from other things; consequently, this constitutes the proper mark of a thing that subsists for itself, as Leibniz[7] had long held without proof.

§117. (*How power is distinguished from faculty.*) Power, however, must not be confused with a mere faculty, since a *faculty* is only the possibility of an action and, on the contrary, because power is a source of changes, an effort or striving to do something must be met with in it.

§118. (*Things that subsist for themselves are striving to act.*) On account of the fact that in a thing that subsists for itself a power is to be met with, there must also be a striving to act (§116), that is, a striving to change its limits (§§106–7).

§119. (*How action is distinguished from striving.*) If this striving is advanced continuously, then an action emerges from it. Insofar as there is nothing at hand as to why it should not be advanced, that is, when nothing obstructs it, then it will be advanced (§30), and accordingly action always results when there is no obstacle at hand.

§120. (*What an effect and an efficient cause*[8] *are.*) Accordingly, it is through a power that that which was merely possible attains its fulfillment, or complement, that is, the possible is brought to actuality (§14). Now, however, that which attains its actuality by means of action is called the *effect*. By contrast, that thing which assists in bringing the possible to actuality, that is, which *produces something*, is called an *efficient cause*. For example, when the sun melts the wax, this takes place through continued warming. And therefore, the warming on the part of the sun is its *action*, the melting is the *effect*, and the sun itself is the *efficient cause* by which the action is executed. [. . .]

§121. (*State of a thing.*) The manner of limitation is that which we call the *state* of a thing. Now if this limitation occurs in that through which the thing subsists, then it is called the *internal state* of a thing; if it pertains to that which is external to a thing, that is, to that through which it relates to other things, then it is called the *external state* of the same.

§125. (*Simple things have a power.*) Simple things cannot be limited in any other way than by degree (§106). That, however, which is indivisible and is limited only by degree is a power: for there is more at one time in an indivisible thing than another, through which the magnitude of the degree is also given. Now, since this multiplicity finds its reason in the simple thing (§32), and indeed, as something changeable (§111), it is not absolutely necessary (§41), so it cannot attain its actuality otherwise than through the action of the simple thing (§116). Action, however, issues from a continually increasing effort or striving (§119), and therefore a simple thing must have a power.

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[7] Wolff provides a citation here referring to the "*Acta eruditorum* of the year 1695" but this reference is later corrected to "1694" as Wolff is referring to Leibniz's essay, "*De primae philosophiae emendatione, et de notione substantiae*" ("On the Emendation of First Philosophy and the Notion of Substance") published in that year.

[8] Wolff indicates that "*würckende Ursache*" is his rendering of "*causa efficiens*" in the first register.

§126. (*Simple things change their limits.*) Because, accordingly, any given simple thing is constantly striving to change its limitations (§119), and consequently is actually changed when nothing resists it (§119), and yet it cannot itself resist such changes insofar as it would have to have a striving to change and not to change its limitations at the same time, which cannot take place in a simple or indivisible (§75) thing (§10); so, therefore, limitations must indeed be constantly altered and in this way its state is constantly changed (§121).

§127. (*They are things that subsist for themselves.*) One accordingly sees that any given simple thing has a source of its changes in itself (§§125–6), and therefore is a thing that subsists for itself (§114).

§132. (*What order is.*) When many are considered together as one and there is something similar to be found in them, an order arises from them, so that *order* therefore is nothing other than the similarity of the many in one.

§134. (*How the definition of order applies to space and time.*) [. . .] [It] may be helpful if I show that an order similar to that described in §132 is to be found in time as well as in space. In space, I encounter manifold things, namely, the different ways in which a given thing may exist simultaneously among many things, which we tend to call places (§47). These ways agree with one another in that a given thing is outside of all of the others and is removed by some particular distance from each. And in these respects, they are similar to one another (§18). Therefore, since one takes all places together as a whole, the order of those things that exist simultaneously consists in the similarity of the manifold. One can show in a similar manner that the same holds of time.

§142. (*What truth and dream are.*) Because everything has its sufficient reason why it is (§30), so there must always be a sufficient reason why the changes in simple things follow one upon another in such a way and not otherwise, why the parts in composite things stand next to one another in such a way and not otherwise, and why their changes follow upon one another in such a way and not otherwise. Accordingly, there is an order here of the same sort as is found in the orderly completion of a proof (§135). Now, since such an order does not obtain in dreams, where through our own experience we find that no reason is to be provided for why things are by one another, and so stand next to each other, and also for why their changes follow one upon the other, so from this one distinctly recognizes that truth is distinguished from dream through order. Accordingly, *truth* is nothing other than order in the changes of things; by contrast, *dream* is disorder in the changes of things.

§144. (*Origin of truth.*) Whoever has considered the matter carefully will readily recognize that without the principle of sufficient reason there can be no truth.

§145. (*When one cognizes truth.*) It is further clear that one cognizes truth when one understands the reason why this or that can be, that is, the rules of order that are to be encountered in things and their changes (§§141, 129).

§146. (*There is truth in all things.*) Accordingly, because an order (§132) arises insofar as all things, simple as well as composite, find a reason in one another (§30), so there is truth in them. As a result, there is something true in every thing.

§152. (*What perfection and imperfection are.*) The agreement of the manifold constitutes the *perfection* of things. [. . .] *Imperfection* consists in the fact that the parts of the manifold run counter to one another.

§156. (*In perfection there is sheer order.*) In perfection there is sheer order, for where there is perfection, everything relates to a common reason or ground. And when this obtains, the manifold that is to be met with in one thing is similar (§18). As a result, since order consists in the similarity of the manifold (§152), there is sheer order in perfection.

§175. (*That there are contingent things and where they come from.*) [. . .] When something could be otherwise than it is, then what is opposed to it contains nothing contradictory in it (§11), and therefore that thing is not necessary (§36). Now, since one tends to call something that is not necessary *contingent*, it is clear that that is *contingent* for which it is also possible for what is opposed to exist, or which is not contradicted by what is opposed. [. . .]

Chapter 3: On the Soul in General, namely, what we Perceive of it

§191. (*Plan.*) Here I do not yet want to show what the soul is and how changes take place in it; rather, my present intention is merely to explain what we perceive of the soul by means of everyday experience. I will not introduce anything more here than what anyone can cognize who attends to himself. This will serve as a basis for the derivation of other things that one cannot so easily see.

§192. (*What is here understood by "soul."*) However, in order that one might know what is to be perceived, it should be noted that by "*soul*," I understand that thing which is conscious, and therefore we want to investigate here what we perceive of ourselves insofar as we are conscious.

§194. (*When we do and do not think.*) I have already mentioned above (§45) what the first thing is that we perceive of our soul when we attend to it, namely, that we are conscious of many things as outside us. When this takes place, we say that we *think* and accordingly call *thoughts* those changes of the soul of which it is conscious (*Logic* ch. 1, §2). By contrast, when we are not conscious as, for instance, in sleep or even at times when waking, we tend to say that we are not *thinking*.

§195. (*On what basis we cognize thoughts.*) Accordingly, we suppose being conscious as a mark on the basis of which we cognize that we think. And thence arises the tendency to say that being conscious cannot be separated from a thought.

§196. (*Difference among thoughts.*) We find however a difference among thoughts when we think of things outside of and in us, namely, we find it to be the very same as I have shown to hold among concepts in the *Logic* (ch. 1, §9f). Although I could no doubt simply appeal to that discussion, it will nonetheless serve our purposes if I briefly reiterate this difference here.

§197. (*On what basis we cognize what is in us.*) Because, however, I contended that this difference obtains whether we are thinking of things outside or in us, it is necessary that I first explain the basis from which we cognize that something is in us, since it was already shown above (§45) how we gather that something is outside us. Insofar namely as we are conscious of some things, for instance, when we see buildings or people, we cognize by means of the principle of contradiction cited above (§10) that I, who am conscious of a thing am not that thing of which I am conscious. Therefore, I cognize it as differentiated from me (§17). Because, however, nothing more is found in myself than consciousness, that is, my thoughts (§194), so I do not assign anything further to me than thinking, and accordingly whatever belongs to this, I regard as in me. In this way, we see something as in us when we find that it is the very thing on the basis of which we cognize ourselves, just as we tend to posit as in a *thing* that on the basis of which we cognize it; for example, I cognize the sphere on the basis of its figure, but we posit this figure in the sphere. And therefore, when I say that *there is something in a thing* it should be understood in no other sense than this, namely, that I cognize the thing on this basis and differentiate it from others.

§198. (*What clear thoughts are.*) Some thoughts are constituted in such a way that we know quite well what we think and are able to distinguish them from others. When this is the case, we say that they are *clear*. For example, I now see buildings, people, and other things. I am quite conscious of what I see and can recognize each given thing and differentiate it from others. On account of this I say that my current thoughts are clear.

§199. (*What obscure thoughts are.*) By contrast, when we do not properly know what we should make of what we think, then our thoughts are *obscure*. For example, I see from afar something white on the field but do not know what I should make of this insofar as I cannot properly differentiate one part from another; thus, the thought that I have of it is obscure.

§201. (*Where clarity comes from.*) Therefore, *clarity* arises from noticing the differentiation in the manifold; *obscurity* however arises from the lack of so noticing.

§202. (*When something becomes clearer.*) We thus find that a thing becomes clearer to us the more that we notice its differentiation from others; by contrast, the less we perceive this the more obscure it becomes. This applies as much in the sciences as it does in ordinary life.

§203. (*What the light of the soul is.*) When our thoughts are clear we say that it is *light* or *bright* in our soul. However, just as we otherwise tend to call that light which makes the surrounding bodies visible in the world, such that namely we can see and recognize them through their difference from one another, so we also call that a light in our soul which makes it such that our thoughts are clear and that we can recognize one apart from the other through their difference, that is, it is that which assures us of that difference. It is not yet the time, however, to investigate what it is in which this light consists.

§206. (*When thoughts are distinct.*) It sometimes happens that we determine the difference among that which we think and, thus, are also able to relate it to others when asked. Then, our *thoughts* are *distinct*. For example, when I think of a triangle and a square, I can determine the difference between the triangle and the square, and if someone should ask me how I differentiate these figures from one another and both from all other figures, I can also relate the difference. Here, namely, it depends on the number of sides: in the triangle there are three lines, but in the square, there are four that bound it. And in this way, I recognize that the thought of the triangle is different from the thought of the square. With this, however, the thoughts of the triangle and of the square are distinct. [. . .]

§207. (*Where distinctness comes from.*) It should be noted that our thoughts always contain a multiplicity in them. Now when we think of something, and our thoughts are clear with respect to its parts or with respect to the manifold that is encountered in one of them, then from this clarity distinctness arises. Insofar as we attain clear thoughts of the parts such that we can differentiate them from one another, even if we are not capable of determining the proper difference, then we have a distinct thought of the whole. [. . .]

§213. (*State of obscure thoughts.*) By contrast, when there is altogether no clarity concerning those things which we think at once, then we cannot differentiate them from one another at all (§198) and there is neither clarity nor distinctness in the whole thought which encompasses everything we think at once. And then we are in a state of obscure thoughts.

§214. (*When our thoughts are indistinct.*) It often occurs, and mostly among certain people, that they do not determine the difference of that which they think, and therefore cannot relate it to others when asked. When this is the case, our *thoughts* are *indistinct*. For example, when I see a red color, I know quite well to differentiate it from green, yellow, and other colors, and accordingly the thought which I have of it is clear. Yet, I cannot determine the difference, and therefore also cannot relate, when one asks me, in what the difference between the red color and the green or another color consists; therefore, my thought of it is indistinct.

§217. (*What we think of the body.*) The things which we represent as outside of us are one and all composite things which we differentiate through magnitude, figure, and color, and whose position with respect to one another and changes in the same, as well as of their parts, through motion are perceived by us. We tend to call these things *bodies* and below, in the proper place, we will investigate what they actually are.

§218. (*On what basis we cognize our body.*) Among these bodies we take one for *our own body* because the thoughts of other bodies are directed in accordance with it and it always remains present to us as all the others change.

§220. (*What sensations, senses, and the organs of sense are.*) We tend to call the thoughts which have their reason in the changes in the organs of sense and which are occasioned by corporeal things outside us *sensations*, and the capacity for sensation *the senses*; the organs, however, in which these changes occur, are called *the organs of the senses*.

§235. (*What imaginings are, and what the imagination is.*) One tends to call the representations of such things as are not present *imaginings*. And the power of the soul to produce such representations is called the *imagination*.

§236. (*How imaginings are to be distinguished from sensations.*) Since imaginings do not clearly represent everything contained in the original sensations (§231), there is great obscurity in them and in this way they are distinguished from sensations, and indeed we tend to distinguish the former from the latter in just this way. For example, when I imagine a person who I have seen at another time, but also see another person before me, a significant difference between the two becomes evident. For, concerning the former, even though I can quite well represent whatever pertains to figures and magnitudes, as well as to the positions of the parts with respect to one another, nonetheless the colors remain almost entirely absent and everything becomes rather dark. By contrast, my sensations represent the colors to me in a lively way; therefore, everything looks obscure with the imagined person, but with the real person everything is bright and clear.

§238. (*The rule of imaginings.*) One finds, however, that imaginings take their origin from sensations and indeed in the following way. When our senses present something to us that has something in common with a sensation which we had at another time, then that same thing occurs to us again. Now if this has, in turn, something in common with a sensation or imagining that we had at some other time, then this likewise occurs to us again. In this way, imaginings continuously vary, one after another. [. . .]

§239. (*How to define dreams.*) Now since dreams are nothing but imaginings, from the foregoing we can derive the reason or ground of dreams; namely, these also take their origin from a sensation that does not suffice to wake us and something is thereby reproduced which we have otherwise sensed or imagined which, however, has something in common with the present sensation. After this, it proceeds in the manner just outlined concerning imaginings.

§240. (*Why there is no order in dreams.*) Now because these things which we imagine one after the other do not find their reason in one another, so in dreams nothing finds its reason in one another. [. . .] In this way, one can understand why there is no order of the sort that obtains when it comes to truth (§142).

§248. (*How we recognize that we have had a thought before.*) Here the question arises concerning how we know that we have already had a thought before, for instance, that we have already seen a person. Notwithstanding that this seems difficult to answer at first, yet when we attend to it properly the reason for this becomes quite distinct. Namely, it is because the thought is now in a different order than it was before, both with respect to the other things that existed at the same time with it and those that followed on it. So, when I see a person who I have formerly seen again, I see them in another place, or next to other people, than before, or otherwise clothed than previously, and before I might have looked at them differently, or imagined them otherwise than when I saw them the first time. As a result, when we cannot, for example, accurately represent the place where we previously saw a person, but notice something indistinct by which we recognize that we have seen them before, we grow rather doubtful and say that we have seen that person somewhere but cannot remember where. Once it occurs to us, however, or someone tells us, then we become certain from that place that we have already seen this person before.

§249. (*What memory is.*) Now on account of the fact that we can recognize that we have previously already had thoughts which we reproduce anew, we attribute a *memory* to the soul. Memory, therefore, is nothing other than the capacity to recognize that we have already had thoughts which we had previously, when they occur to us again.

§272. (*When we reflect*[9] *on something.*) When we represent something, whether we sense or imagine it, and direct our thoughts to one part after another that composes it, or to one item in the manifold that is encountered in it, we *reflect* on that same thing and through this progressive attention to one part or to one item in the manifold after another, it becomes clear in its parts or in the manifold (§198) and distinct for itself (§206), though it may yet be that we are unable to determine the difference among the parts or the manifold, in which case the thing remains merely clear (§206).

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[9] Wolff indicates that "*überdencken*" is his rendering of the Latin "*reflectere.*"

§273. (*How we attain to concepts.*) When we reflect on something and are assured through memory that we have also previously sensed or imagined it (§248), we cognize thereby the similarity and difference of things (§§17, 18). In this way, we attain to the representations of the species and genera of things (§182), which one tends to call *concepts* and which are the ground of *general cognition*.

§276. (*When we understand something. What is understandable.*) As soon as we have distinct thoughts or concepts of a thing, then we *understand* it. That is *understandable* which we are able to cognize distinctly.

§277. (*What the understanding is.*) The power of distinctly representing the possible is the *understanding*. And the understanding is distinguished from the senses and the imagination in that, where these latter operate on their own, representations are at most clear but not distinct; by contrast, when the understanding is involved they become distinct. [. . .]

§278. (*When we cognize a thing.*) As soon as we are able to represent something, we *cognize* it. And when concepts are distinct, then our *cognition* is also *distinct*: if these are indistinct, however, then our *cognition* is *indistinct*.

§282. (*When the understanding is pure and impure.*) Because the distinctness of cognition belongs to the understanding, and indistinctness to the senses and imagination (§277), the understanding is separate from the senses and imagination when we have completely distinct cognition; when, by contrast, there is still indistinctness and obscurity in cognition, it is still united with the senses and imagination. In the former case, the *understanding* is called *pure*, and in the latter it is *impure*.

§285. (*Our understanding is never pure.*) In the meantime, experience shows, and we will discuss this in due course, that our understanding is never entirely pure but rather that even amidst distinctness much indistinctness and obscurity remains. [. . .]

§286. (*The understanding brings us to general cognition.*) The understanding shows itself in concepts in that we differentiate what is encountered in a thing that we represent and, inasmuch as we compare it with that which is encountered in other things which differ from it, we determine the difference of things from one another whereby we attain definitions (*Logic* ch. 1, §36) and cognize the genera and species of things (§182). Therefore, it is from the understanding that we have general concepts (*Logic*, ch. 1, §23) and general cognition altogether.

§287. (*When the understanding judges.*) As soon as we differentiate the genera and species of things, as well as the attributes and changes, and their relations to one another, we cognize that this or that thing has this or that in itself, or at least could have it, or also that something could proceed from it, that is, that one could find in it the reason or ground of a change in something else; by contrast, we cognize from another thing which does not have this or that in itself, or could not have it, that something could not proceed from it. And we call this accomplishment on the part of the understanding *judgment*.

§288. (*What judgment involves.*) From this we see that it does not suffice for a judgment when one represents a thing with its attribute or change, or even with its effect; rather, in addition to this is required that we differentiate the attribute, change, or effect from the thing and regard them as two different things that exist together at the same time and indeed where the one is connected with the other. In this way, judgment comes to the representation of the connection of two things with one another. And the same applies to the separation of two things.

§325. (*What experience is. The difference between common experience and experiments.*) We tend to call the cognition that we attain when we attend to our sensations and the changes of the soul *experience*. We call it *common experience* when sensations are provided of themselves, and *experiments*, by contrast, when we only attain them through effort. [. . .]

§326. (*What we have to do with experiences.*) With experiences, then, we can do nothing more than to take note carefully of everything which permits of differentiation from one another, either in the sensation of that which is outside of us or in the state of our soul, and to call each of these things by their proper name so that we do not mix our imaginings and preconceived opinions with experience and in this way seek to *subreptically introduce* certain principles of cognition as are not grounded in things.

§329. (*What kind of cognition one attains through experience.*) Through experience we attain partly to concepts and partly to judgments. [. . .]

§330. (*Where the certainty of experience comes from.*) [. . .] The concepts gained from experience are certain when we cognize their possibility (*Logic*, ch. 9, §24). Now since experience shows us that those same things exist whose concepts it has afforded us with, we thereby cognize that they are possible (§15). Judgments are certain when that which we attribute to things in the judgments pertains, or can pertain, to them (*Logic* ch. 9, §6). Now, if we attain a judgment by means of experience, then we have cognized from this that this or that pertains to a thing, and accordingly it is clear in turn that it can pertain to it (§15). However, because in judgments everything is asserted of a thing under specific conditions (*Logic* ch. 3, §6), it is not certain that something will occur again until these same conditions obtain again, that is, in *similar cases* (§18).

§340. (*What inferences are.*) When we draw a proposition from two others, we call it *inferring*, and the manner in which we infer is called an *inference*. [. . .]

§341. (*Of the particular usefulness of inferences.*) [. . .] Inferences serve, namely, for grasping how one thought always follows from another in an unswerving series and in such a way that one can indicate the reason, or ground, of all thoughts that arise from another and represent something that is not present to our senses.

§347. (*What a demonstration is, and what a proof in general is.*) One sees from this however what a demonstration actually is, namely, a continual connection of many inferences in which the only premises assumed are those whose correctness we recall having previously cognized. Other proofs are not distinguished from it except in that some premises are assumed, the truth of which we have not yet fully ascertained. What I understand by the connection of inferences can be gleaned from the foregoing. An inference is connected with another insofar as its conclusion is made into a premise of the other inference. One also connects two inferences with a third when through the comparison of the formers' conclusions one derives a third proposition which permits of being used as the premise in a new inference.

§361. (*What knowledge is and what science is.*) We tend to affirm that we *know* something when it is derived from indubitable principles by means of correct inferences. And one calls the facility in deriving what one maintains from indubitable principles, by means of correct inferences, *science*.

§368. (*What reason is.*) The art of inferring shows that truths are connected with one another, which should also be proven in its proper place. That insight which we have into the connection of truths is called *reason*. That this definition of reason is in accordance with ordinary ways of speaking is shown in the *Logic* (ch. 2, §16). We say, for instance, that Sempronius has set about his business in a reasonable way when he has taken well into consideration all of the harms and benefits that could be brought about from his actions, and as a result has arranged things in such a way that he does not work against himself in his acts and omissions but rather that each supports the other. Now what does that reason consist in which Sempronius evidences here? Certainly, in nothing else than the insight that he has into the connection of things, namely, the insight into the connection of his actions as much as that into their connection with other things.

§371. (*Experience is opposed to reason.*) Now, because one does not have insight into how what is cognized through experience as being the case is connected with other truths (§325), it follows that there is no reason at all in this cognition (§370), and therefore experience is opposed to reason.

§372. (*Ways of cognizing the truth.*) Accordingly, we have two ways in which we can attain to cognition of the truth. The first is grounded in the senses (§§220, 325), the second however in the understanding (§§277, 368). For example, most people cognize that the sun rises in the morning from repeated experience (§338) and they cannot say why it happens; by contrast, an astronomer who has insight into the cause of heavenly motions and into the connection of the earth with the heavens cognizes this through reason and is able to demonstrate that, why, and at what time it must take place.

§381. (*What kind of cognition comes from reason.*) Because reason is an insight into the connection of truth (§368), but truth is cognized when one understands the reason, or ground, why this or that can be (§145), so [the faculty of] reason shows us why this or that can be. [. . .]

§382. (*When reason is pure.*) When one has such an insight into the connection of things that one can combine truths with one another without assuming any propositions from experience, then reason is *pure*; by contrast, when one is assisted by propositions from experience, then reason and experience are mixed together and we do not see the connection of the truth with others completely. For, when we arrive at a proposition taken from experience, we come to a stop and our reason cannot proceed any further. We find sufficient examples in the sciences that our reason is not always pure, particularly in the cognition of nature and of ourselves. In arithmetic and geometry, just as in algebra, we have examples of pure reason, for here all inferences proceed from distinct concepts and various principles which are abstracted from the senses.

§383. (*Science comes from reason.*) Since science is a facility in proving everything that one maintains on the basis of incontrovertible principles, or in a word, a facility in demonstration (§§361, 347), but in demonstrating something truths are connected together, it follows that through science one cognizes the connection of truths, and therefore science comes from reason.

§404. (*What pleasure is.*) Inasmuch as we intuit perfection *pleasure* arises in us, so that pleasure is nothing other than an intuition of perfection. [. . .]

§417. (*What displeasure is, and how it comes to be.*) [. . .] *Displeasure*, namely, is nothing else than the intuitive cognition of imperfection, whether it is a true imperfection or only has the appearance of imperfection. [. . .]

§418. (*Displeasure is something actual for itself.*) Accordingly, displeasure is not merely the lack of pleasure but rather something actual for itself. This is because, for a mere lack of pleasure it is sufficient that we have no intuitive cognition of a perfection (§404); by contrast, for displeasure, something actual is required, namely, cognizing an imperfection (§417). [. . .]

§422. (*What good is.*) Whatever makes us and our condition more perfect is *good*. For example, the art of discovery makes our understanding more perfect and, therefore, is something good; health makes our body more perfect and, therefore, it is likewise something good. Money makes our external condition more perfect and, therefore, it is also something good. [. . .]

§423. (*The good arouses pleasure, and what it is to be naturally good.*) Because the good makes us and our condition more perfect (§422), and the intuition of perfection arouses pleasure (§404), so the intuitive cognition of the good must arouse pleasure. On account of this, we call that which brings forth pleasure *naturally good*.[10]

§424. (*Distinction between true and apparent goods.*) And through this we can distinguish between true and apparent goods. Namely, a *true good* is what yields a constant pleasure, or at least never causes displeasure; by contrast, an *apparent good* only brings about a fragile pleasure which is often converted into a greater displeasure. [. . .]

§426. (*What evil is.*) Whatever makes us and our condition more imperfect is *evil*. For example, uncertainty makes our condition imperfect and, therefore, it is evil. Sickness makes our body imperfect and, therefore, it is likewise evil. Poverty makes our external condition imperfect and therefore it is something evil.

§427. (*The evil arouses displeasure. What it is to be naturally evil.*) Because the evil makes us and our condition more imperfect (§426), and the intuition of imperfection arouses displeasure (§417), so the intuitive cognition of the evil arouses displeasure. On account of this, we call that which brings forth displeasure *naturally evil*.

§434. (*How sensory desires come to be.*) *Sensory desires* come to be from the indistinct representation of the good, and accordingly these are nothing but the inclination of the soul towards that which we indistinctly conceive of as good. [. . .]

§436. (*How a sensory aversion comes to be.*) The indistinct representation of the evil draws the soul back as it were from that which we conceive of as evil, which one commonly tends to reckon to sensory desire. One could, however, more appropriately call it a *sensory aversion*. [. . .]

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[10] The original reads "*Deswegen nennen wir natürlich gut, was entweder Lust bringet, oder wenigstens Unlust ist*" but the latter clause is clearly problematic and was removed in subsequent editions, so I have omitted it here.

§439. (*What an affect is.*) A noticeable degree of sensory desire and of sensory aversion is called an *affect*. [. . .]

§492. (*What the will is.*) Insofar as we represent something as good, our mind is inclined towards it. This inclination on the part of the mind towards a thing for the sake of the good that we suppose ourselves to perceive in it is that which we tend to call *the will*. For example, someone sees a book lying in a bookstore, leafs through its pages a little, and supposes himself to find things in it that are useful for him to know, that is, he represents the book as good (§422). Insofar as this takes place, he gets a desire to purchase the book. This inclination, which he has towards the book because he takes the book to be good, is called the will. And one says then: he wants, or wills, to purchase the book.

§493. (*What not willing is.*) On the contrary, our mind is withdrawn from something that we represent as evil. This withdrawal of the mind from something for the sake of the evil that we suppose ourselves to perceive in it is that which we tend to call *not willing*. For example, someone sees a book lying in a bookstore, leafs through its pages a little and suppose himself to find things in it that are in part without meaning and in part absurd, that is, he represents the book as evil (§426). Insofar as this takes place, he desires to have nothing more to do with the book, throws it aside and withdraws his mind from it. The withdrawal of his mind from the book which he takes for bad or evil is called not willing. And one says then: he wants, or wills, not to have the book.

§494. (*How not willing is distinct from the omission of willing.*) From this it becomes clear that not willing is something more than the omission of willing. For one omits to will when one does not discern anything good in a thing, as in the previous example when in leafing through the pages of a book nothing is found which one considers to be useful: by contrast, one wants not to have something when one encounters something evil in it [. . .]

§496. (*What motives are, and that the will cannot be without them.*) From the definition of the will we have given it becomes clear that we must always have a reason why we will something, namely, *the representation of the good*, or alternatively a reason why we do not will something, namely *the representation of the evil*. And that this is so is made clear enough from the principle of sufficient reason (§30). For if everything must have a sufficient reason why it rather is than not, so there must also be a sufficient reason why we will and do not will. Now we tend to call these reasons of willing and not willing *motives*.

§502. (*What is to be numbered among motives.*) In addition to this it should be noted that one must not only number distinct representations of the good and evil among motives, but rather also indistinct representations. And accordingly all pleasure and displeasure that a thing now produces, or has previously produced in us, also belongs here (§§423–7), and similarly one must number all affects aroused in us, by which we are presently or have previously been moved by the same thing, among motives.

§506. (*We only will the good, not the evil.*) Meanwhile, what was noted long ago by the ancients remains quite true, namely that we will nothing except what we take to be good, and what we regard as evil is the only thing that we do not will. For motives are either distinct representations of the good and evil (§496), or pleasure, displeasure, and affects (§502), that is, indistinct representations of the good and evil (§§404, 417, 441).

§508. (*With motives of equal weight, one does not come to any resolution.*) Since without motives one can neither will nor not will (§496), it is impossible that someone wills something or not when motives of equal weight are present on each side. As a result, as long as one is doubtful about whether the motives on one side outweigh those on the other or not, one does not come to any resolution. As soon, however, as something is found on one side which is not to encountered on the other, and accordingly through which the equilibrium is upset, then the weightier side prevails. [. . .]

§511. (*False concept of freedom.*) Accordingly, those err who define freedom in terms of a capacity of choosing one or the other of two contradictory things without a motive being present for why one chooses the one over the other. Their error is clear, namely, by means of what has been comprehensively exposited here, and such a capacity is contrary to reason (§369) as well as to experience (§325).

§513. (*How to obtain a better concept.*) In order that we can now obtain a better and more fruitful concept of the freedom of the will, let us investigate precisely (*Logic* ch. 2, §16) what the character is of our actions which we call free.

§514. (*How we understand free actions.*) In so doing, we find [1.][11] that what we understand is involved in these actions, or conceive them distinctly (§276). For example, when it is the question of whether I should buy a book or not, I am aware what kind of book it is and what I am supposed to exchange for it. I know whether the same book is serviceable to my own ends or not, and whether I could do without as much money as it costs.

§515. (*They are not necessary in themselves.*) We find, 2., that the actions that we call free are not absolutely necessary inasmuch as that which is opposed to them is possible just as well (§36). For example, in our case of the book it is possible just as well to buy the book as not to buy it. For all the motions of the bodily members that are required to make the purchase are possible in themselves and the required sum of money similarly lies ready. However, it is also possible to omit these motions and undertake others.

§516. (*Motives also do not make them necessary . . .*) Now even though there are motives present for why an action is preferred, nonetheless they do not on that account render it necessary in itself. For these leave out how the object of the action is constituted and the capacity of executing it at one time or another, and cannot make any difference in these. For example, although I consider the book to be useful to me, and thereby get the desire to buy it, nonetheless nothing is changed either in the book, in the motions of the bodily members required to buy it, or in the other required circumstances as well; rather, everything remains as before, namely, it can happen or not. One is just as possible as the other.

§517. (*. . . but rather only produce certainty.*) Meanwhile, it of course remains the case that motives are that which makes the possible actual (§14),[12] and insofar as they suffice for this, they yield *certainty*. For example, when one asks why I am buying the book, since I could have omitted doing so just as well as doing it, I cite as the cause the fact that I regard it as useful to me and that the money I must give for it does not strike me as a hefty sum. And as soon as I frame the resolution for the sake of this motive it becomes certain that I will purchase the book, but not necessary since it remains as possible now as before that I omit to make the purchase (§516). Therefore, it frequently happens in the meantime that the firm resolution is nonetheless changed again (§505), and as a cause one cites the fact that something interfered. If motives had rendered things necessary, then it would not have been possible that something would have been able to interfere (§36).

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[11] Wolff offers three such characteristics, the latter two of which he numbers. This is presumably the first.

[12] Here it might be kept in mind that the German word for motive is "*Bewegungs-Grund*," which contains the term "*Grund*" (i.e., reason or ground).

§518. (*The reason of free action is in the soul. What is spontaneous.*[13]) Finally, we find, 3., that the soul has in itself the reason of its actions that we tend to call free. For the representations that are needed for motives (§496) are in it and come from it, and it is inclined through its own power towards whatever pleases it and withdraws itself from whatever displeases it. And insofar as the soul has the reason of its actions in itself, to that extent one attributes a *spontaneity* to it, and calls that the reason for which is to be found in the soul *spontaneous action and omission*.

§519. (*What freedom is.*) When we take all this together, it becomes clear that *freedom* is nothing other than the power of the soul, through its own spontaneity, for choosing that one among two equally possible things that pleases it most.

§520. (*On what it is grounded.*) Now since the insight into the connection of things shows what is good and evil, better or worse (§§422, 426), it follows that [the faculty of] reason is the ground, or reason, of freedom (§368).

§521. (*What sort of necessity there is in freedom.*) It cannot be denied that it is impossible for someone who cognizes something as better to prefer the worse to it, and in this way it necessarily transpires that he chooses the better. Yet, this necessity is not contrary to freedom: for the individual is not thereby coerced to choose the better because he could also choose the worse were it pleasing to him, insofar as the one as well as the other are possible for and in themselves (§516). As previously mentioned, it only produces a certainty of a sort that otherwise would not be met with in human actions. And should I later turn to an exposition of human actions, it will be shown that without this kind of necessity there would be no hope for any certainty in ethics.

§527. (*Agreement of the soul with the body, and how to perceive it carefully.*) Nothing more remains here than for me to consider what we perceive of the agreement of our thoughts with certain changes in the body and, in turn, what we perceive of the agreement of certain motions in the body with certain thoughts in the soul. Here, however, it is especially necessary that we keep in mind what was recommended above concerning experiences (§326[14]), and indeed all the more so because concerning the matter before us many prejudices are commonly and incautiously introduced subreptically, preventing one from cognizing the truth.

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[13] Wolff indicates in the register that "*Willkühr*" (usually translated into English as "power of choice'" is his rendering of the Latin "*spontaneitas*," and so I have opted to render it thus here.

[14] Corrected from "§316."

§528. (*The agreement of the soul with the external senses.*) When external things produce a change in our organs of sense, sensations arise simultaneously in our soul, that is, we are immediately conscious of these things. [. . .]

§529. (*That no action of the body on the soul comes to light thereby.*) However, one must be wary lest one detrimentally reads more into this experience of the truth than is warranted (§527). We perceive nothing more than that two things exist simultaneously, namely, a change that occurs in the sensory organs and a thought whereby the soul is conscious of the external things which cause the change. In no way, however, do we experience an action[15] of the body upon the soul. For were this to be the case, we would have to have a concept of it, and if not a distinct one then at least a clear concept (§325[16]). Whoever attends carefully to themselves, however, will find that he does not have even the least concept of such an action, and accordingly we cannot say that the assertion of an action of the body upon the soul is grounded in experience. He who will speak precisely can ascribe no more to our experience than that two things exist at the same time; however, it can by no means be concluded from this that the one is the cause of the other [. . .].

§530. (*Needed reminder.*) One would do well to note that the activity of the body upon the soul is not rejected on account of this; rather, it is set aside for further investigation. For it would not only be incorrect if we would say: whatever we cannot define, that is, whatever we do not have a distinct concept of, cannot be; in addition, I hold that it is also objectionable for one to say: whatever we do not have any concept of at all, is not. I will demonstrate below that we cannot even say: whatever we are not conscious of in our soul is not to be met with in it.

§535. (*Agreement of the body with the soul.*) We also note, by contrast, that certain motions in the body follow when the soul desires these same motions. For example, I want to reach for something, so I stretch out my arm for it. I want to stand up and walk away, and this also takes place.

§536. (*That no action of the soul upon the body comes to light from this.*) If, here as well, we do not want to advance further than what we experience, then we can say no more than that certain motions of the body occur at that time when we will the same, or when they are omitted, or when they are not willed. Since, however, we again have no concept, not even a clear one, of the action of the soul through which it should bring about motion in the body, so one cannot pass such an activity off as grounded in experience, as is evident from what was already said before (§529).

§539. (*Union of the soul with the body.*) One tends to say, concerning this agreement of the thoughts of the soul with some changes in the body, and of some motions in the body with the will of the soul, that the soul is *united* with the body. What, however, this *union of the soul with the body* consists in does not permit of being shown before it is already established how it is possible that the soul agrees with the body in the previously mentioned ways.

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[15] In the first register, Wolff indicates that both "*effectus*" and "*actio*" are possible Latin equivalents of "*Würckung*"; in the remainder of the chapter, I have opted to render it consistently as "action"

[16] Corrected from "§352."

Chapter 4: On the World

§540. (*Why the world is treated here.*) Before we can understand what the soul actually is and what reason there is for what has been adduced thus far concerning it, we must first come to understand what a world is. For it will be shown in what follows that one can conceive neither the essence of a spirit in general nor of the soul in particular before one understands what a world actually is and what sort of constitution it has.

§544. (*What a world is.*) Now since the actuality of things does not belong with their essence (§35), but real definitions merely exhibit the essence of a thing (*Logic* ch. 1, §48), so it follows from what we have already noted that the *world* is a series of changeable things that are next to one another and follow one upon the other but which are altogether connected to one another.

§545. (*When things are connected to one another.*) I say that things are *connected* to one another when a given one among them contains the reason in itself why another is next to it, exists simultaneously with it, or follows upon it.

§546. (*When things are connected according to space.*) If, among things that are simultaneous, one contains the reason in itself why the other exists simultaneously next to it, then one thing among them has its particular way in which it exists simultaneously with the others. As a result, that thing has its particular place (§47), and therefore they are connected with one another according to space.

§547. (*When they are connected according to time.*) If, among things that follow one upon the other, the preceding thing contains the reason in itself why the other succeeds, and by contrast, the succeeding thing contains the reason why the former precedes, then they follow one upon the other in an order (§§132, 134), and therefore are connected with one another according to time (§94).

§548. (*In the world, everything is connected according to space and time.*) Now, since things in the world are connected with one another, both insofar as they exist simultaneously and insofar as they follow one upon the other (§544), so they are connected with one another as much according to space as according to time (§§546, 547).

§549. (*The world is something singular.*) That which is connected together according to space and time constitutes *one thing*. For, it is from the connection of what is different according to space and time, that one cognizes that there is but one *thing*. Now, since everything is connected with one another according to space and time in the world, so the world is to be regarded as *one* thing.

§550. (*The world is a whole that consists of parts.*) Accordingly, the world is a whole and things which are next to one another, as well as those which follow one upon the other, are its parts (§24).

§551. (*It is a composite thing.*) Whatever consists of parts is a composite thing (§51). Now since a world is a whole that consists of different parts (§550), so a world must be a composite thing.

§552. (*Essence of the world.*) As a result, its essence must consist in the manner of composition (§59), and accordingly one world can be differentiated from another in no other way than in the manner of composition.

§557. (*The world is a machine.*) [. . .] [T]he world is likewise a machine. The proof of this is not difficult. A machine is a composite artifact, the motions of which find their reason in the manner of composition. The world is also a composite thing, the changes of which find their reason in the manner of composition (§544). And, accordingly, the world is a machine.

§558. (*There is order and truth in it.*) Because everything in the world finds its reason in one another, according to time as well as space (§548), there is order in the world and its changes (§§132, 138), and consequently also truth (§142).

§561. (*Where events in the world draw their certainty from.*) Because the present state of the world finds its reason in its preceding state, and the future state in the present one (§§547, 548), the events in the world thereby obtain their certainty. And inasmuch as the world is a machine (§557), all events that take place in it are thereby rendered certain.

§562. (*What sort of necessity there is in it.*) As events in the world are certain, it is not possible that they should not come to pass. And, in this way, they must come to pass, and consequently to that extent they are necessary (§36).

§563. (*This is treated further.*) I say that events are only necessary to the extent that the preceding one was, and therefore not absolutely. Namely, any given event is necessary insofar as one presupposes a specific connection of things. Now when this connection is not necessary, but can also be otherwise, then events are not necessary in themselves but are rather contingent, as is the connection in which they find their reason (§175). Accordingly, we cannot judge whether the events in the world are absolutely necessary or not before it is established whether the connection in which they find their reason, that is, the world itself (§544), is necessary or not.

§565. (*How events in the world find their reason in it.*) In order to now ascertain whether events in the world are contingent or necessary, let us investigate whether the world itself is necessary or whether it is to be numbered among contingent things. For this, however, it is required that we investigate more precisely how its events find their reason in it. For example, the dawn sky at present is clear and starry. This has its cause: a morning wind blows that is dry and therefore brings pleasant weather with it. The morning wind has, in turn, its cause, although we might not know it, and its cause has its own cause in turn, and so on through all time. Now, however, since everything in the world finds its reason in one another according to space, so the morning wind near us also has its causes in those things that exist next to it simultaneously in the world. And this is partially explained when one shows, in the context of the consideration of physics, how a wind can come to be. And since everything finds its reason in one another, so this connection to the wind must also proceed through all of space. Accordingly, if one were able to have a complete conception of why the sky is presently clear, one would find that everything in the entire world, that has ever existed in it or that still does, contributes something to it. [. . .]

§567. (*That an opposed event belongs in an entirely different world.*) Consequently, if the most trivial event in the world is supposed to be other than it is, everything before it in the world would have to have been different, and everything that occurs after would also have to come to pass differently than it will currently.

And therefore, there would have to be an entirely different world than what presently exists (§17) [. . .].

§569. (*More than one world is possible.*) Given that, from what has been said, it becomes clear that there could be many other connections of things than that which presently obtains (§565ff), and because a series of such things that are connected with one another according to space as well as time constitutes a world (§544), so more than one world is possible, that is, outside of the world to which we belong, or that we sense, there are still others possible that are completely distinguished from one another with respect to their events as they are from our world (§47). [. . .]

§575. (*Distinction of the necessary.*) [. . .] What is possible in this world must also come to pass, if it has not done so already or does not still exist, and it is impossible for it to be omitted; for otherwise the reason it has in the present connection of things would not be sufficient, which is contrary to what we have accepted (§12), and thus cannot be the case (§10). In this way, it is necessary (§41); namely, it is necessary with respect to the present connection of things, but not absolutely for itself (§36). There is, however, a notable difference between that which is *absolutely necessary* and that which is only *necessary under a* certain *condition* or, as concerns our present topic, with respect to the present connection of things. [. . .] Insofar as one tends to call the latter the *necessity of nature* or *natural necessity*, so, by contrast, one tends to call the former *geometrical necessity* as well as metaphysical necessity [. . .].

§576. (*The world is a contingent thing.*) Since the world could have been otherwise than it is (§569), it belongs among contingent things (§175) and is therefore, in respect of its actuality, not necessary (§36). I emphasize that this is with respect to its actuality, for with respect to its essence it is and remains, like all other things, necessary (§38). [. . .]

§578. (*All of its events are contingent.*) [. . .] It should nonetheless be noted that that which one calls the necessity of nature does not properly deserve the name of necessity inasmuch as the concept of necessity does not pertain to it absolutely (§36), but rather it should actually only be called *certainty*. [. . .] Along with this it should be noted that the necessity of nature only properly extends to the essence of things and not to their actuality, inasmuch as the actuality of the entire world, considered as a thing with all of its parts and the events it comprises, is contingent. What takes place in the world comes to pass necessarily insofar as it belongs to the essence of the world, which is necessary (§576); by contrast, with respect to its actuality, what takes place remains as contingent as the actuality of the world itself (§576). [. . .]

§579. (*Correct understanding of the contingent.*) Now we obtain a correct understanding of the contingent in the world. Namely, we recognize that contingent events cannot attain to their actuality otherwise than through a series of innumerable other things, that proceed before them and exist simultaneously next to them, in such a way that should one want to indicate their reason, that reason always has a new reason, without end. By contrast, in that which is necessary, one comes quickly to an end, since one ultimately finds a reason where one can stop. [. . .]

§582. (*What elements are.*) Because a world is a composite thing (§551), there must be simple things from which its parts are composed (§76). These simple things are typically called *elements.*

§584. (*Constitution of the elements.*) Since elements are simple things (§579[17]), everything holds of them which was elaborated above in detail concerning simple things in general. They have a power (§125), through which they change their inner state incessantly (§§126, 121), and they are something that subsists for itself (§127) and so cannot cease to be otherwise than through annihilation (§102).

§593. (*Why one given simple thing is now here and not elsewhere.*) Because everything must have its reason why it is (§30), so there must also be a reason why a given simple thing is here rather than elsewhere. Now, however, since space and time contain nothing in themselves from which one could understand why this or that simple thing, at this or that time, is here rather than elsewhere—inasmuch as the parts of space as well as of time have nothing in them through which they permit of being differentiated from one another (§§46, 94)—so the sought-for reason cannot be found in them (§29). Accordingly, if it cannot be found outside of simple things, it must be found in them; consequently, we must come across it in the internal state of a given simple thing.

§594. (*Also why these and not others are next to one another.*) Since everything has its sufficient reason why it rather is than not (§30), so there must also be a sufficient reason for why a given thing is encountered next to these things and not next to others. Now, however, because even here as well the reason is not to be sought in space or in time, insofar namely as they are regarded as empty of the things that are found in them (§§46, 94), so it must in turn be found in those things that are next to one another, and therefore in the internal state of simple things (§565).

§595. (*Origin of perfection in composite things*:) Following this, the internal state of a given simple thing directs itself according to the other simple things that are around it (§§593, 582[18]). And as a result all of them agree with one another, through which the perfection in the composite is attained (§152)

§596. (*In the entire world.*) Because all composite things are connected with one another in the world (§544), and simple things are connected with the rest of the simple things such that they constitute a composite thing (§595), so the internal state of a given simple thing must also direct itself according to all composite things that are around it, like a center-point, in the world. And in this way each of the simple things accords with the entire world: from which arises the perfection of the world (§152[19]).

§597. (*What simple things effect.*) The internal state of a simple thing is nothing else but the manner of limitation of that through which it subsists (§121): the alterations of the limitations are its changes (§107): its changes are nothing other changes of the degree (§106) of its power (§115). Now, since in this way simple things are constantly active (§120), so there must be something produced through their action which relates not only to all other simple things that are surrounding it but also to all composite things in the entire world.

§598. (*Their activity is set aside for further investigation.*) What it actually is that is produced by the action of simple things, is something that we will set aside for further investigation. Leibniz was of the opinion that the entire world is represented in a given simple thing, which provides a comprehensible explanation of how one given simple can be differentiated from others and can relate to the entire world in a particular way, and even how it relates differently to the things that it has around it as well as those that are further away.

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[17] This is corrected from "§594."

[18] Wolff originally and anomalously refers to "§1."

[19] Corrected from "§597."

§599. (*Unities of nature.*) And from this one understands what Leibniz has in mind with his *monads* or *unities of nature*, which he also tends to call *the indivisible of nature*. Now it should be noted that, according to him, these unities are by no means conscious of all of that which is represented in them. One could accordingly say: one of Leibniz's *unities* is a mirror of the entire world which it represents in it according to the point where it is. However, since we previously set aside the investigation (§598), it suffices for us that we have provided a distinct concept of *the Leibnizian unities of nature*, and have shown at the same time how they are not contrary to what we have proven concerning simple things in the world (§597).

§600. (*Universal harmony of things.*) As I have also distinctly proven in the foregoing that the internal state of a given simple thing relates to everything else that is in the world (§596), and Leibniz accounts for this in that in any given simple thing the entire world is represented according to the point where it is (§599); so now one also understands further how, in his opinion, all things in the world, including even the smallest, can accord with one another, and what he has in mind with his *universal harmony of things*. However, since we do not yet want to establish what the internal state of simple things actually consists in such that it relates to everything in the world, so we will also set aside for now what it is that the universal harmony consists in, and it is enough for us that we have proven that it does obtain and that Leibniz has explained it in a very intelligible fashion.

§602. (*How simple things fill space.*) Since, again, each simple thing relates in a particular way to the others (§595), it exists simultaneously in a particular way with the others such that none among them can exist in just this way with the others. And, therefore, not only is each outside of the other (§45) but also many together follow upon one another in an order (§§132, 133), and thus they fill space (§46), even though any one among them actually does not fill any space but only has its own specific point in it.

§603. (*How composite things come from simple things.*) It is now time for me to explain how it is possible for composite things, which have parts, to nonetheless come from simple things that have no parts at all that might touch each other. But one who understands the constitution of simple things correctly will not find this difficult to grasp. For, because each of them exists simultaneously with the others in a particular way, such that none of them can exist with the others in the same way (§602), so it is not possible that many could exist simultaneously in the same point but rather each requires its own point. Meanwhile, since each is connected with those that are around it (§545), many simple things together make up a single thing (§549), and the composite thereby acquires an extension in length, breadth, and depth (§53).

§606. (*Constitution of bodies*) Having considered simple things, we must also come to composites. Now, what was proven of them in general above must hold for any composites that are to be met with in any world. We call the composite things that are in our world *bodies* or also *corporeal things* and it is accordingly clear that a body necessarily fills a space (§52) and is extended in length, breadth, and depth (§53), that it has a figure (§54), permits of being divided (§58) and set into motion (§57), that its essence consists in the manner of composition (§59), that it has a measurable magnitude (§61), that it can come to be anew and cease to be again (§64), that it can undergo changes in magnitude and figure without changing its essence (§§65, 66, 68), and likewise that it has internal motions without impairment of its essence (§71).

§607. (*What matter is.*) [. . .] We have seen that a body has an extension and therefore permits of being divided into many parts (§606[20]), and experience confirms this of bodies in our world. In addition, we find that a body has a power of resisting motion, so that it cannot be set into motion before this resistance is overcome. Now that which is provided with extension along with its power of resistance is called *matter*. We know from the foregoing, however, that extension along with abiding in one place comes from simple things as the elements of the composite (§§603, 605), and accordingly matter is no disorderly lump, that is, no heap thrown together of similar parts in which nothing but magnitude could be distinguished; rather, everything within it is distinguished from one another in a quite particular way. And the common concept of matter merely stems from the imagination, which represents things indistinctly and therefore overlooks what is in them (§214).

§615. (*Changes of bodies occur through motion.*) Again, no change can take place in bodies, as composite things (§606), other than in magnitude, figure, or place of the parts or also of the whole (§72). Now, since none of these can happen without a change of place (§§65, 68, 47), so all changes occur through motion.

Chapter 5: On the Essence of the Soul and of a Spirit in General

§727. (*Present intention.*) In the third chapter, above, I have in fact already treated the soul in detail, but only insofar as we perceive its effects and are able to attain a distinct concept of it (§191[21]). Now we have to investigate in what the essence of the soul and of a spirit in general consists, and how what we have perceived of it and noted above finds its reason in it. In the course of this, there will be still more and different things that will be treated to which experience does not easily lead us.

§728. (*Why we take our start from consciousness.*) The first thing that we noted concerning ourselves was that we are conscious (§1), that is, that we know we now represent many things as outside of us (§144). For example, I know that I now see the mirror and my form in the mirror. Accordingly, let us now investigate how it transpires that we are conscious of this.

§729. (*When we are conscious of something.*) We find, accordingly, that we are conscious of things at that moment when we differentiate them from one another. As in the first example given, I am conscious that I see the mirror when I not only differentiate the various parts that I perceive in it from one another, but also represent the difference of the mirror itself from other things. When we do not notice the difference among things that are immediately present to us, then we are not conscious of what occurs to our senses. [. . .]

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[20] Originally "§607" but corrected in subsequent editions.

[21] Corrected from "§91."